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Summary 
With an increasing amount of semi-structured data, XML has 
become significant to humans and programs. XML promoted by 
the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) is rapidly emerging as 
a new standard language for semi-structured data representation 
and exchange on the Internet.  XML documents usually contain 
private information that cannot be shared by all user 
communities. So securing XML data is becoming increasingly 
important and several approaches have been designed to protect 
information in websites. Usage control has been considered as 
the next generation access control model with distinguishing 
properties of decision continuity. It has been proven to be 
efficient to improve security administration with flexible 
authorization management. Usage control enables finer-grained 
control over usage of digital objects than that of traditional 
access control policies and models. XML Schema defines 
format and contents of XML instance. Access control based on a 
schema will be transported to all its instances. Also, XML 
Schema provides a mechanism to build relationships between 
schemas and elements.    
 
In this paper, we present a usage control model to protect 
information distributed on the web, which allows the access 
restrictions directly at Schema-level and XML document-level.   
Finally, comparisons with related works are analysed. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The extensible markup language (XML) [3] is a standard 
for describing the structure of information and content on 
the Internet over the past several years. XML is a 
fundamental component in many XML web services and it 
is used to store and exchange data in the Internet 
environment that may include private messages of 
customers. It overcomes the complexity of Standard 
Generalized Markup Language (SGML) [7] and the user 
can define document structures, removing the limit of the 
fixed tags in Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) [14]. 
The following example displays library customer 
information in an XML document. 
 
 
 
 
<?xml version= “1.0” encoding= “UTF8”?> 
   <bookInfo xmlns= 
      “http://www.library.com/BooksInfo”> 
     <library city= “Toowoomba”> 
       <books> 
        <available>  
          <categorize> children’s book    
          </categorize> 
          <story book> 
             <description> 
                <English comedy story> 
             </description> 
             <author >John Mahanee</author> 
          </story book > 
        </available > 
        <loan> 
          <categorize>magazine    
          </categorize> 
          <title> girlfriend f</title> 
          <reader>   
             <name > Tony </name > 
             <address> Jilan street, 5  
             </address> 
             <city> Toowoomba </city> 
          </reader> 
         </loan> 
       </books> 
      </library> 
    </bookInfo> 
 
Table 1: XML Document Example 
 
XML documents not only show the contents of data but 
also the constraints and relationships between data in 
Table 1. The element bookInfo   includes library element, 
and books element is a sub-element of library.  While sub-
element books is combined with their own sub-elements. 
Since an XML document can express complex 
relationship between data, it can satisfy with varying 
security requirements. XML is used to store and exchange 
data in the Internet with including private messages, some 
users may like to access some particular parts of an XML 
document. In the above example in Table 1, for the 
available objects everyone can read all information. 
However, some users' access to information such as loan 
and reader will be restricted. This is because when an 
internal or external user accesses this document, his/her 
access permission has to be limited according to security 
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policies.  This example shows that secure XML documents 
form a significant topic for research.  
 
We identify two levels at which authorizations on XML 
documents can be defined, instance and the Document 
Type Definition (DTD) [11, 17, 16]. Instance level 
authorizations denote privileges that only to a specific 
document. DTD level authorizations specify the privileges 
of all documents following a given DTD. XML Schema is 
an XML-based alternative to DTD. It defines the contents 
and relationships of elements in an XML instance. It 
supports complex constraints for XML components, such 
as elements, attributes, datatypes and groups. A well-
validated XML document must follow the format specified 
by one or several schemas. In our proposed access model, 
a user access permissions are defined on schema or 
schema element level and will be transported to all XML 
instances specified by these schemas or elements. In the 
access control model the central authority uses XML 
schemas to specify the format of information to be 
changed. With the features of XML Schema, a flexible 
and easy-customized access control model can be achieved. 
 
Access control has been considered as a major issue in 
information security community since the beginning of the 
Information security discipline. Through access control, 
the system can restrict unauthorized users access to the 
resources in the system and guarantees the confidentiality 
and integrity of the resources [4, 5, 12]. Traditional access 
control models primarily consider static authorization 
decisions based on the subjects' permissions on target 
objects. It focuses on the protection of data in a closed 
environment. More recently research in authorization is 
about trust management.  Trust management [2] relates 
authorization to a user's capability and properties. These 
access models have used on the control of access to 
server-side objects. Digital rights management (DRM) [6] 
is used for objects disseminated. Current DRM solutions 
are largely focused on payment-based dissemination 
controls.  Because each of access control, the authorization 
decisions are generated at request time but do not consider 
ongoing controls for long access or for revocation. We 
need a comprehensive, systematic approach for controls 
on usage of digital objects [13, 15]. Recently proposed 
usage control is a new access control model extending 
traditional access control models in multiple aspects. The 
term ‘usage’ means usage of rights on digital objects. The 
main different properties of usage control with traditional 
access control models are continuity of access decision 
and mutability of subject attributes and object attributes. 
In this paper, we propose authorization models which 
adopt usage control to manage access both at the instance-
level and at the schema-level. Traditional access control 
gives an access request and an algorithm which computes 
a view of the target XML document based on the user's 
requirement's right.  It has analysed authorization 
decisions on a subject's access to target resources before 
access. However, usage access control authorization 
decisions are not only checked and made before access, 
but also are repeat checked during the access period. 
Meanwhile obligations and conditions become decision 
factors for the management of XML documents. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 illustrates the background of XML and two 
XML validations: XML DTD and XML Schema. The 
usage control model and Continuity properties are 
introduced in this section. Section 3 shows our proposed 
authorization models for usage control using XML 
Schema. It includes pre-Authorizations, ongoing-
Authorizations,  
pre-Obligations, ongoing-Obligations, pre-Conditions and  
ongoing-Conditions. Section 4 reviews the differences 
between this works from others. Finally, Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Related technologies 
 
2.1 XML 
 
XML [3] is a markup language for describing semi-
structured information. An XML document consists of 
elements, attributes and text node, each delimited by a pair 
of start and end tags (e.g. <price> and </price>) or by an 
empty tag. The content of each element is a sequence of 
elements or text nodes. An element has a set of attributes, 
each of which has a name and a value.  XML documents 
can be classified into two categories: well-formed and 
valid.  A document is said to be well-formed if it follows 
the grammar rules of XML, such as there is exactly one 
element that completely contains all other elements, 
elements may nest but not overlapped, etc. A well-formed 
document is valid only if it contains a proper DTD in the 
source and if the document obeys the constraints of that 
declaration. Validation requires an XML instance to 
contain specified elements and attributes. On the other 
hand, since XML is a structural transformation, it can 
transform one structure to another structure. 
 
2.2 XML Validation: DTD and Schema 
 
Document Type Definition (DTD) and XML Schema [8, 9] 
are two main validation specification mechanisms. DTD is 
the first and earliest language to define the structures and 
contents of XML documents. A DTD is a file which 
contains a formal definition of a particular type of XML 
documents. It contains or points to markup declarations 
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that provide a grammar for a class of documents. Each 
DTD is also a schema and XML documents corresponding 
to that DTD are instances of that schema. But it has some 
limitations: Firstly, a DTD file is neither a well-formed 
nor a valid XML document. It is difficult to specify 
constraints on structures and contents of XML instances 
with DTDs. Secondly, it is hard to handle the name 
confliction in DTDs. Such as a student who is involved in 
two departments, the two course names in each department 
will conflict if a DTD is applied by both of them. Finally, 
a DTD can not define datatypes. As a result, it makes 
difficult to use by other DTDs. On the other hand, an 
XML Schema is an XML-based alternative to DTD. An 
XML schema describes the structure of an XML document. 
XML Schemas express shared vocabularies and allow 
machines to carry out rules made by people. They provide 
a means for defining the structures, contents and semantics 
of XML documents. XML Schemas are extensible to 
future additions. XML Schemas are richer and more 
powerful than DTDs. XML Schemas are written in XML. 
XML Schema is an XML document itself. It supports data 
type and namespaces. Complex user-defined datatypes can 
be created in XML Schemas.  Namespace is supported in 
XML Schemas to solve name conflictions.  With these 
reasons, XML schemas are a richer and more powerful of 
describing information than what is possible with DTDs. It 
will be very soon that XML Schemas will be used in most 
Web applications as a replacement for DTDs. Since DTD 
is not XML well-formed and valid-formed, the access 
control policy on XML instance documents and DTD have 
to be implemented separately. By using schemas, we can 
define and enforce the permissions on schema objects and 
instance objects with a uniform mechanism.  
 
The example below in Table 2 displays an XML Schema 
for  a corresponding valid XML instance in Table 1. 
 
<?xml version= “1.0”  encoding= “UTF-8”? >   
     <xs:schema     
              
targetNamespace=“http://www.library.com/BooksInfo”>  
              xmlns:xs= “http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema” 
              elementFormDefault=”qualified”> 
        <xs:annotation>  
               <xs:documentation> 
                    Book Information Instance 
               </xs:documentation>  
        </xs:annotation>  
     <xs:element name= “bookInfo”>  
       <xs:sequence>  
            <xs:element name= “books”  type= “xs:string”/> 
                    <xs:element name= “available”/> 
                        <xs:element name= “categorize”  
                                             type= “xs:string”/>  
                        <xs:complexType> 
                            <xs:sequence> 
                              <xs:element name=”storybook”/>  
                                 <xs:sequence> 
                                   <xs:element name= “description”  
                                                          type= “xs:string”/> 
                                      <xs:element name= “auyhor”  
                                                           type= “xs:string”/> 
                                    </xs:sequence> 
                                 </xs:complexType> 
                              </xs:sequence> 
   <xs:element name= “loan”> 
     <xs:sequence> 
         <xs:element name=“categorize”  type= “xs:string”/>  
         <xs:element name= “title”  type= “xs:string”/>  
         <xs:element name= “reader”  type= “readerInfoType”/>  
      </xs:sequence> 
    </xs:element> 
<xs:complexType name= “readerInfoType”> 
   <xs:sequence> 
           <xs:element name=“name”  type= “xs:string”/>  
           <xs:element name= “address”  type= “xs:string”/>  
           <xs:element name= “city”  type= “xs:string”/>  
   </xs:sequence> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs:schema> 
 
Table 2: XML Schema Example 
  
An XML Schema defines elements and attributes that can 
appear in a document. It also defines which elements are 
child elements, the order of child elements and the number 
of child elements. It gives data types for elements and 
attributes, default and fixed values for elements and 
attributes. 
 
2.3 Usage control  
 
In this section we briefly review the general ideas of usage 
control and its authorization models. The usage control is 
a generalization of access control. It enriches and refines 
the access control discipline in its definition and cover 
obligations, conditions, continuity (ongoing controls) and 
mutability. There are eight core components in the usage 
control model: subjects, subject attributes, objects, object 
attributes, rights, authorizations, obligations, and 
conditions [13, 18] (see Figure 1). The authorization, 
obligations and conditions are components of usage 
control decisions. In the usage control model, the 
authorization rule permits or denies the access of a subject 
to an object based on subject and object attributes. 
Obligations are performed by subjects or by the system. 
Conditions are not related to subject or object attributes. 
They are system environment restrictions. 
 
In the usage control model, subjects and objects are 
familiar concepts with traditional access control. Subject 
and object attributes can be used during the access 
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decision process. Subject attributes are identities, group 
names, roles, memberships, security clearance, and so on. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1 Components of Usage Control Model 
 
 
Objects are entities that subjects hold rights on, whereby 
the subjects can access or use objects. For instance, in an 
on-line shopping store, a customer can be subject. A price 
could be an object attribute, the soybean machine is priced 
at $88 and with delivery is required at $98. Rights are 
privileges that subjects can hold on objects. The 
authorizations of rights require associations with subjects 
and objects. A right represents the access of a subject to an 
object, such as read or write. 
 
Authorizations, obligations and conditions are decision 
factors used to check and determine whether a subject 
should be allowed to access an object. Obligations and 
conditions are new concepts that can resolve certain 
shortcomings that have been in traditional access controls. 
In general, the authorization of most traditional access 
controls are assumed to be done before access is allowed. 
However in the usage control model it extends this for 
continuous enforcement. Authorizations may require 
updates on subject and object attributes. The process of  
continuity properties in usage control model consists of 
three phrases, before usage, ongoing usage and after usage. 
To enforce control decisions, we have two different types: 
pre-decision and ongoing-decision. For mutability, there 
are three kinds of updates: pre-update, ongoing-update, 
and post-update. Therefore, Authorizations can be either 
pre-authorization (preA) or ongoing-authorization (onA). 
Pre-authorization is performed before authorization is 
required to the access. But ongoing authorization may be 
performed during the access, such as when a book 
stocking list in a bookstore is periodically checked while 
the access is in progress. 
 
Obligations are requirements that a subject must perform 
before (pre) or during (ongoing) accesses. Conditions are 
decision factors that depend on environmental and system-
oriented requirements. Subject and object attributes can be 
used to select which condition requirements have to be 
used for a request. 
 
Based on the involvement of three decision factors: 
authorizations, obligations, and conditions, we focus on 
developing the usage control models for the XML 
Schemas and XML documents. We assume that a usage 
request exists on an XML target object. Decision-making 
can be done before (pre), during (ongoing) or after the 
exercise of the requested right.  Based on the requirements 
we have six possible cases as a model for usage control: 
pre-Authorizations, ongoing-Authorizations, pre-
Obligations, ongoing-Obligations, 
 
3. Authorization models with XML Schema 
 
In a real environment, the resource of XML objects based 
on different XML Schemas from various servers and 
organizations. Therefore there will be vast number of 
schema components. On the other hand, the vast number 
of users will make subjects complex. With all these 
features, the security administration will be very complex 
in both centralized and decentralized deployments. 
 
An XML provides a uniform mechanism to solve 
problems in the environment. To apply the modularity, 
extensibility information flow in an XML format, all the 
components in our models, such as subjects, subject 
attributes, objects, object attributes, rights, authorizations, 
obligations, and conditions will be specified in an XML 
format. Through some XML operations, the content of a 
target XML document will be customized for a user to 
access with his permissions. Particular schemas will be 
identified security related information, and XML instances 
can be centrally stored or distributed among the 
organizations. Figure 2 shows the implementation layout 
based on our proposed architecture presented in Section 2. 
The entire messages transported among the services are 
identified in XML. XML requests and responses are XML 
messages, whose formats will be defined in schemas. 
 
In this model, there are schema objects and instance 
objects. Schema objects (SO) are mapped to instance 
objects (IO) by an instance mapping (IM) function. In this 
authorization model, a Schema object is an XML Schema 
or schema component(s). An instance object is an XML 
instance or instance component(s). Instance Mapping is a 
mapping between SO and IO. In the following we explain 
the details of the model process. 
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Fig.2 XML Architecture with usage control 
 
 
A.  Usage control for pre-Authorization Model 
(UCMpreA) 
 
In a pre-Authorization usage control model, the decision 
process is performed before access is allowed.  The 
following illustration of usage decision that can be 
expressed on the documents XML Schema and instance 
level are made in pre-authorizations. 
 
The UCMpreA model consists of the following 
components: S, XSch, XD, R, R1, ATT(S), ATT(XSch), 
ATT(XD), IM and  usage decision Boolean functions preA, 
preA1 on XSch, XD,  respectively, where S, XSch, XD, R, 
R1  represent Subject, XML Schema object, XML 
document object and Rights required on XML Schema 
level and XML document, respectively.  ATT(S), 
ATT(XSch), ATT(XD) represent attributes of subjects, 
XML Schema object and XML document object, 
respectively. IM represent Instance Mapping between SO 
and IO.  preA and preA1  are predicates about 
authorization functions. 
     
1. allowed (s, xsch, r) ⇒   preA(ATT(s), ATT(xsch), r), 
    where A ⇒  B means B is a necessary condition for A.  
In this example this predicate indicates that if subject   s is 
allowed to access XML Schema level xsch with  right  r, 
then the indicated condition preA must be true. 
 
2. allowed (s, xd, r1)⇒   
                     preA1(ATT(s), ATT(xd), r1), 
    In this example the allowed (s, xd, r1) predicate 
indicates that if subject s is allowed to access XML 
document xd with right r1, then the decision function  
preA1 must be true. 
 
3. IM:  SO →2 IO . 
    Where IM is a one-to-many mapping relationship from 
SO to IO. In our model, we use IM to implicitly specify 
the authorization in the instance level. Specifically, the 
attributes defined on schema objects will be transported to 
all its instance objects. 
 
The UCMpreA model provides an authorization method 
on whether a subject can access the XML Schema and 
Instance level document. The allowed(s, xsch, r) predicate 
shows that subject s can access the XML Schema object. 
The allowed(s, xd, r1) predicate shows that subject s can 
access the XML document object.  At this process, private 
information in XML Schema and corresponding XML 
documents are restricted. 
 
B. Usage control for ongoing Authorizations Model       
(UCMonA) 
 
A usage control model for ongoing-Authorizations model 
is used to check ongoing authorizations during access 
processes. In this model, usage requests are allowed 
without any ‘pre’ decision making. 
  
The UCMonA  model has the following components: 
S, XSch, XD, R, R1, ATT(S), ATT(XSch), ATT(XD) and IM 
as before, and  ongoing usage decision functions onA on 
XSch (XML Schema level) and  onA1 on XD (XML 
document). onA and onA1 are used to check whether S can 
continue to access or not. 
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1. allowed (s, xsch, r) ⇒  true, 
This is a prerequisite for ongoing authorization on  
XML Schema object xsch. 
 
2. allowed (s, xd, r1) ⇒  true,  
    This is a prerequisite for ongoing authorization on XML 
document object xd. 
 
3. stopped (s, xsch, r)⇐  ┐onA(ATT(s), ATT(xsch), r), 
The access of subject s to xsch is terminated if the 
ongoing authorization onA is failed. 
 
4. stopped (s, xd, r1)⇐   
           ┐ onA1(ATT(s), ATT(xd), r1), 
The access of subject s to xd is terminated if the 
ongoing authorization onA1 is failed. 
 
5. IM:  SO →2 IO . 
The mapping relationship is the same as those in pre-
Authorization model. 
 
In this model usage decision Boolean functions are onA, 
onA1 instead of preA, preA1. During this process the 
requested access is always allowed as there is no pre-
authorization all the time. Both allowed (s, xsch, r) and 
allowed (s, xd, r1) are required to be true, otherwise 
ongoing authorization should not be initiated. Ongoing 
authorizations are active throughout the usage of the 
requested right, and some requirements are repeatedly 
checked for a continued access. These checks are 
performed periodically based on time or event.  In the 
process when attributes are changed and requirements are 
no longer satisfied, stopped procedures are performed. 
Stopped (s, xsch, r) and stopped (s, xd, r1) indicate that 
rights r and r1 of subject s on object XML Schemas and 
XML documents are revoked and the ongoing access 
terminated. For example, a limited number of 
simultaneous usage, suppose only two administration staff 
can access the information about the price of sold books in 
an object XML Schema level simultaneously. If a third  
administration staff requests access and pass the pre-
authorization, the staff with the earlier time access is 
terminated. While this is a case of ongoing authorizations, 
it is important that the certificate should be evaluated in a 
pre decision. 
 
Due to the length of the paper, other authorization models 
are omitted. In practice, the six models pre Authorizations, 
ongoing-Authorizations, pre-Obligations, ongoing-
Obligations, pre-Conditions and ongoing-Conditions may 
need to be combined for an access control. We obtain an 
authorization method for XML Schemas and XML 
documents and their elements by checking users' (subjects') 
authorizations, obligations and conditions with continuity 
properties. The following algorithm in Table 3 is based on 
these models and introduces how to manage an XML 
document access control when a user (subject) applies to 
access an XML Schema with right r and an XML 
document with right r1. The output of an access control 
decision is required to satisfy some expected schemas. The 
function im(target'.xsd) is to check if output target'.xml 
can be validated by target'.xsd. Since the authorization 
process can remove some parts of the input object, the 
output may not satisfy some particular schemas, which are 
required by most applications. In this case, the access will 
be denied. 
 
XML-based Algorithm: 
Input:  Access request: (u, r, target.xml) 
             Schema of target: target.xsd 
             Schema of expected output: target'.xsd 
Output:  target'.xml 
Method: 
 // Verify UCMpreA: 
1) if preA(ATT(s), ATT(xsch), r) ∪  preA(ATT(s), ATT(xd),  
     r1) = false 
// The process in pre-Authorization is not successful  
2) ACCESS denied;  
3) endif; 
4) if target'.xml ∈im(target'.xsd) 
5) ACCESS target.xml is permitted; 
6) Output target'.xml; 
7) else ACCESS denied;  
8) endif; 
 
// Verify UCMonA:  
9) if preA(ATT(s), ATT(xsch), r) ∪  preA(ATT(s), ATT(xd),  
     r1) = false 
// The process in pre-Authorization is failed, don't need     
    further verification. 
10) Application denied; 
11) endif; 
12) if onA(ATT(s), ATT(xsch), r) ∪   onA(ATT(s), ATT(xd),  
       r1) = false 
13) ACCESS stopped; 
14) if target'.xml ∈im(target'.xsd) 
15) ACCESS target.xml is permitted; 
16) Output target'.xml; 
17) else ACCESS denied;  
18) endif; 
 
          Table 3: Algorithm of XML Access Control 
 
4. Related Work  
 
Xinwen, Jaehong and Ravi [19] introduced an extended 
role based access control (RBAC) model for XML 
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security. In their model, permissions are defined based on 
XML Schema components and will be transported to all 
instances.   The permission reuse through these hierarchies 
provides the security administration. Several constraints 
are presented in the model. The proposed model can be 
modularly deployed and flexibly administrated in 
distributed environments. The model can be readily 
applied to no-schema based XML instances and instance 
level authorizations. However, our work substantially 
differs from that proposal.  The main differences in our 
approach are in the following aspects. Firstly, their 
protocol is based on RBAC and hence it focuses on 
permissions-role assignment, objects hierarchies and 
constrains. Our approach is based on usage control, we 
have analysed the characteristics of various access 
authorizations and presented detailed models for different 
kinds of authorizations. Secondly, their approach does not 
mention how to update users' permissions on XML object 
when their conditions or obligations have changed.  It is 
an important state for XML documents in the Internet 
since users always alter their conditions or obligations.   
By contrast, users in our scheme have to pass pre-
Authorizations and ongoing-Authorizations as well as pre-
Obligations, pre-Conditions and ongoing-Obligations and 
ongoing-Conditions.  This indicates that our method is 
much more powerful in dynamic environments.    
 
Elisa and Elena [1] presented an access control system 
supporting selective distribution of XML documents 
among possible large user communities by using a range 
of key distribution methods.  In their papers, a formal 
model of access control policies for XML documents is 
given. It focuses on key distribution methods to protect 
XML documents. The approach consists of encrypting 
different portions of the same document according to 
different encryption keys, and selectively distributing 
these keys to the various users.  By contrast, our work 
provides a rich variety of options that can deal with XML 
documents. Users can access XML documents with their 
keys at any time, even when their properties are updated. 
In our scheme, users have to satisfy pre-Authorizations, 
pre-Obligations and pre-Conditions as well as ongoing-
Authorizations, ongoing-Obligations, ongoing-Conditions. 
 
 
5. Conclusions and future work  
 
In this paper we introduce XML Schema, XML, usage 
control and discuss access models for XML Schemas and 
XML documents by using usage control. Comparing with 
XML DTD, XML Schema has richer use than XML DTD. 
Usage control models provide an approach for the next 
generation of access control.  In usage control we analyse 
not only   decision factors, such as authorizations, 
obligations and conditions, but also the continuity 
properties.  This paper also illustrates two different kinds 
of models built for XML Schemas and XML documents. 
The methods presented in this paper can be used to control 
XML documents in a dynamic environment.  It also begins 
a new application with usage control.   
 
Obviously, access control in Web services will be popular 
in the future since all messages and protocols in Web 
services are in XML format. Only using traditional access 
control is not adequate for modern application needs. The 
Schema based usage control model can be a solution of the 
Web service security. This paper represents only a first 
step for XML Schema level authorization in XML 
documents with usage control. Much work is still to be 
done before these models can be used in practice. 
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